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In 1998, 120 members of the United Nations adopted a treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court, designed to address issues such as war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.  The United States, in cooperation with its European allies, 
was instrumental in bringing this treaty about.  In the end, however, it felt compelled to 
withdraw its signature, an unusual step signifying a high level of dissatisfaction with the 
structure and competency of the Court.  This thesis argues that, while the United States 
maintains good relations with Europe, its abandonment of the ICC has constituted a 
major setback to Euro-American relations, and entailed a loss of face among the 
international community as a whole.  Even as the United States has stood aloof from the 
Court, fearing that its soldiers and officials could face politically motivated trials, 
Europeans have continued their vigorous efforts to make the ICC a success.  The United 
States and Europe are now on opposing sides on a major issue of international criminal 
justice.  This has already caused tensions over internationally sanctioned peacekeeping 
troops, and has the potential to further disrupt the Euro-American partnership, above all 
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 I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ICC AND EURO-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
Nor, again, is it at all strange that one who comes from contemplation of 
divine things to the miseries of human life should appear awkward and 
ridiculous when, with eyes still dazed and not yet accustomed to the 
darkness, he is compelled, in a law-court or elsewhere, to dispute about 
the shadows of justice or the images that cast those shadows, and to 
wrangle over the notions of what is right in the minds of men who have 
never beheld Justice itself.  
- Plato, The Republic (ca. 427-347 B.C.)  
(The Allegory of the Cave) 
 
Therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason 
alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for 
desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when 
they are the best of men.  The law is reason unaffected by desire…. Hence 
it is evident that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or neutral, 
for the law is the mean. 
- Aristotle, Politics (384-322 B.C.) 
(The Rule of Law) 
 
On July 17, 1998 in Rome, 120 Member States of the United Nations (UN) 
adopted a treaty that established for the first time in history a permanent and independent 
international criminal court.1  The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into force on 
July 1, 2002 with the ability to investigate and prosecute those individuals committing 
crimes considered to be of sufficiently high magnitude as to concern the international 
community.  This treaty was the result of the international community having failed to 
prevent multiple episodes of gross atrocities in the twentieth century.  The most 
influential instances of these gross acts happened on European soil, above all the 
Holocaust of European Jews during World War II, but also the mass genocide that 
occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s.  It does not belittle other episodes - such 
                                                 
1 Derived from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, located at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/, [accessed 
6 December 2002]. 
1 
as the killing fields in Cambodia, genocide in Rwanda and other instances in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America - to note that it was two separate counts of genocide in Europe, 
for good or ill, that had the most significant political impact.  These events led the 
involved nations to produce wartime tribunals to prosecute those responsible for the 
heinous acts; the International Military Tribunal (IMT), better known as the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trials, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), also know as the Hague Tribunal, respectively.  Much of the effort to create such 
institutions was done through European and American cooperation.  The Treaty of Rome, 
establishing the International Criminal Court was no different.  Euro-American efforts 
formed the necessary basis for the treaty.  Yet when it came time to sign and ratify the 
treaty, something went terribly wrong.  During the approval process that occurred in 
Rome in July of 1998, “the United States found itself in a nasty minority, siding with 
Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Qatar, China, Sudan against the Court.”2 
The United States maintains itself as a moral, ethical, and just leader in the 
international community.  By backing out of the Treaty of Rome, American diplomats 
have aroused significant concern from European allies and the world community at large.  
It is feared that the United States is intent on slowing down the process of bringing 
international criminals to justice and securing a more stable future for the world.  Has the 
United States strained relations with its European allies by not ratifying the Rome Statute 
and deciding to withdraw its signature from the Treaty?  The major argument posed by 
this thesis is that, although the United States maintains good relations with Europe, its 
non-ratification and decision to withdraw its signature3 from the Treaty of Rome have 
caused a political setback vis-à-vis its European allies, and loss of face among the greater 
international community.  The goal is not necessarily to provide an answer to whether the 
ICC is good or bad or whether the U.S. and European stances on the ICC are good or bad.  
                                                 
2, Ruth Wedgwood, “Fiddling in Rome,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 1998): 20. 
2 
3 In a communication received on 6 May 2002, the Government of the United States of America under the 
administration of George W. Bush informed the Secretary-General of the following: "This is to inform you, 
in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the 
United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal 
obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention 
not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this 
treaty." 
Rather the ICC will be examined as an episode that has put a dent into trans-Atlantic 
relations, which may lead to further degradation of the historical friendship between 
America and Europe and damage international progress if events continue along the 
present course.  This may not have a great impact on economic ties or immediately affect 
military cooperation but there will be some serious consequences for items such as post-
war proceedings – for example, post-war Iraq.  Equally important are the legal 
proceedings that will arise as the United States continues to pursue the war on terrorism, 
which will require international backing and support.  And it has already been seen in 
instances, such as the continuing UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, that the long term 
American stance on the issue has the potential to disrupt operations and degrade mission 
readiness of internationally sanctioned forces.4 
This chapter will provide an introductory overview of the ICC and an initial look 
into the Euro-American political setting in which the Court resides.  Chapter II will 
consider past attempts of international criminal justice posed by cooperation between 
Europe and the United States starting with the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg.  The precedents established at Nuremberg will be reviewed and some 
opinions about the shortcomings of the IMT will be explored.  American and European 
points of view on the overall significance of Nuremberg will be compared.  The second 
half of the chapter will move to the next major attempt of international criminal justice 
implemented through Euro-American cooperation at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), otherwise known as the Hague Tribunal.  Here, the 
chapter will also consider whether the Hague Tribunal is an improvement upon the 
Nuremberg experience.  Again, the goal is to keep perspectives of both the United States 
and Europe in mind.  Other historical and perhaps equally important international 
tribunals, such as the “Tokyo half” of the IMT and the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) will not be examined, as the focus will be on the two major precedents on 
European soil.  Chapter III will use the history established in Chapter II to introduce the 
arguments for and against the ICC from both American and European points of view.  It 
                                                 
4 In July 2002, the United States threatened to withdraw troops from Bosnia (UNMIBH – United Nations Mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) unless immunity for American soldiers from the ICC was granted.  The UN Security Council 
granted the United States a one-year stay of immunity for its soldiers in Bosnia and all non-signatories of the ICC 
treaty.  Once the year is up, the Security Council will re-evaluate the issue. 
3 
will also examine the details of why the United States supported the creation of the ICC 
but then failed to join the treaty by ratification and in fact withdrew its initial signature5 
from the treaty.  European reaction to American actions and the effects on Euro-
American relations will be the focus of the remainder of the chapter.  Chapter IV will 
look at what lies ahead for the ICC and explore ways the United States and Europe can 
amend or reconcile their cooperative effort to improve upon international criminal justice.  
Some implications and predictions for future progress of international criminal justice 
will be made. 
As a consequence of the U.S. rejection of the Rome Statute, Americans and 
Europeans are now placed on differing sides on the issue of international crimes.  This is 
important because future prosecution of these crimes may be obstructed or hindered due 
to this opposition that now exists between the trans-Atlantic powers.  This study intends 
to examine past attempts of prosecuting international war crimes, review the creation and 
status of the ICC while focusing on Euro-American relations throughout this process. 
 
A. DEFINING EUROPE 
It is intended that this thesis examine the relations of the United States and Europe 
in regard to the ICC but it is evident that asked to list the countries that comprise Europe, 
different people would provide very different lists.  Some may wish to narrowly include 
only those member-countries, fifteen in total to date (although there are some thirteen 
candidate-states), of the European Union (EU) but this would exclude many countries 
that must not be excluded from the overarching definition of Europe such as Norway, 
Switzerland, and Poland; Norway and Switzerland have no intention of joining the EU.  
Many of the recognized eastern European countries that are members of the Council of 
Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would be 
also be excluded along with the smaller powers of “old Europe” such as Liechtenstein, 
Malta, Andorra, San Marino, Monaco and the Holy See.  Those concerned with Western 
security and defense issues would definitely consider the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
                                                 
5 In final day of his presidency in December 2000, President Clinton signed the Rome Statute to show his 
administration’s support for the Treaty. 
4 
Poland and Turkey part of Europe, especially considering their membership in NATO 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization).6 
Despite this challenge, it is common for diplomats, scholars, pundits, media and 
others to refer to Europe both as a collective geographic area and as a conglomeration of 
policies and political attitudes.  It is true that it would be a mistake to consider the politics 
of France and Great Britain as indistinguishable.  However, it is widely recognized that 
Europe holds a special commonality in the realm of international relations that far 
exceeds its continental meaning, that is, Europe is much more politically bound together 
than, say, Asia or Africa.  There is obviously little point in comparing Europe to 
Antarctica.  Thus it is with these thoughts in mind that this study will examine Europe, 
the United States and the ICC. 
 
B. ESTABLISHING THE ICC 
On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly recognized the need for “an 
international judicial organ.”7  This was the day that Resolution 260 was issued which 
invited the International Law Commission to study the creation of an institution that 
could try persons for international crimes, specifically genocide.  The lesson from World 
War II and the Nuremberg Trials was that it is absolutely necessary to prevent mankind 
from repeating the horrible atrocities experienced in the Holocaust.  The sentiment 
“Never Again” was a creation of the times.  The International Law Commission 
concluded that it was both desirable and possible to establish an international court to try 
persons charged with genocide and other crimes of similar weight.  By 1953 a draft 
statute was finalized. 
With the onset of the Cold War, further progression on the court ceased and it was 
not until December of 1989 that the UN considered resuming work on establishing an 
international criminal court.  In 1993, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia erupted and 
                                                 
6 For an excellent and brief layout of Europe with respect to some major international organizations, refer to figures 
such as The European Security Architecture, found in: David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, the Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998): xxi. 
7 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – taken from Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court ‘Overview’ webpage, located at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/, [accessed 6 December 
2002]. 
5 
what was once thought to be an impossible reliving of the past happened again.  
Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity became, once more, the highest of 
international concerns.  There was no time, however, to develop a robust and all-inclusive 
court because judicial service was quickly needed to help bring an end to the existing 
crisis.  The UN decided to create an ad hoc tribunal as had previously been done at 
Nuremberg. 
The International Law Commission continued its work, however, and by 1994 it 
submitted the final draft of a statute to the General Assembly.  A Preparatory Committee 
was then tasked to write the convention establishing the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  The resulting statute was finally adopted on July 17, 1998 and opened for 
signature.  Sixty ratifications were necessary to make the treaty effective and this was 
achieved on April 11, 2002.  This meant that as of July 1, 2000, genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity committed after this date are eligible for trial by the ICC. 
 
C.  OVERVIEW OF THE COURT 
The long-held dream of a permanent International Criminal Court is 
nearing reality.  Our hope is that by punishing the guilty, the ICC will 
bring some comfort to the surviving victims and to the communities that 
have been targeted. More important, we hope it will deter future war 
criminals, and bring nearer the day when no ruler, no State, no junta and 
no army anywhere will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.
 - Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General 
It is common for some to confuse or to identify the ICC with the ICJ – the 
International Court of Justice.  The ICJ is the judicial body of the UN having the 
jurisdiction to hear cases concerning one country (or state) against another.  The ICC, on 
the other hand, has a mandate to try individuals rather than states and does not fall under 
the purview of the UN, even though the establishment and maintenance of the ICC has 
depended on the direct effort the UN.  Although it is independent, the ICC does maintain 
an open line of communication with the UN.  The ICC is supposed to complement 
existing national judicial systems and is designed to act only if national courts are 
unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute such crimes. 
6 
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole.  Although this expression is vague, the Court has 
jurisdiction in accordance with the statute with respect to the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.  Jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression will not go into effect until an agreed upon definition of the crime is arrived at 
and the conditions concerning this crime are established.8  Other matters of 
dissatisfaction and contention are also present, such as many countries have raised the 
fact that the ICC does not cover terrorism or drug trafficking.  However, the crime of 
terrorism and drug trafficking could be potential additions pending the approval of the 
State Parties. 
The following is a summary of how the ICC interprets the three broad categories 
of crime under its present jurisdiction: 
* 
Article 6: Genocide 
Genocide are any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group;  (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group;  (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article 7: Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity means any of the following acts when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) 
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  (h) Persecution 
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with 
any act referred to in this definition or any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of 
                                                 
8 Aggressive crimes will be formulated in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations outlawing 
aggressive war unless acting in self-defense or with the permission of the UN. 
7 
apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health. 
Article 8: War crimes 
War crimes are prosecuted particularly when committed as part of a plan 
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. Examples:  
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected 
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention;  (b) Other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict, within the established framework of international law; (c) In the 
case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious 
violations of the Geneva Conventions committed against persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention; (d) Examples of armed conflicts not of an international 
character are situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature; (e) 
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed 
conflicts not of an international character, within the established 
framework of international law; (f) Other serious violations are defined as 
armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is 
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups. Nothing in contained in the 
definition of war crimes shall affect the responsibility of a Government to 
maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity 
and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.9 
* 
There are only certain conditions in which the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction 
and only as long as it meets one of four conditions:  1) one or more of the parties 
involved is a State Party; 2) the accused is a national of a State Party; 3) the crime is 
committed on the territory of a State Party; 4) a State not party to the Statute decides to 
accept the court’s jurisdiction for a specified crime over one of its citizens.10  All these 
conditions, however, coexist with the fact that an ICC prosecutor who is an independent 
attorney will be assigned to each case.  Thus, either the prosecutor must initiate an 
                                                 
9 The section marked with asterisks (*) is taken directly or paraphrased from the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court located at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/, [accessed 6 December 2002].   
10 Kenneth Roth, “The Court the U.S. Doesn’t Want,” The New York Review of Books (19 November 
1998): 45. 
8 
investigation or a state partied to the treaty (or the UN itself) can refer cases for trial 
before the ICC. 
The ICC will physically be located in the Hague, Netherlands, where construction 
is underway to give the Court a home by 2007.  Until then, the Court resides in facilities 
adjacent to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Since 
the ICC is a separate entity from the UN, the statute mandates that the Court will be 
funded by States Parties and by voluntary contributions from governments, international 
organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities.  The UN could, in special 
circumstances, provide funds with approval of the General Assembly.  Funding will be a 
critical issue in the absence of U.S. support.  Other organizations receiving funding from 
the UN will likely be unwilling to surrender funds from their causes in order to promote 
the ICC.   Those who believe that “the love of money is the root of all evil” may assume 
that the main problem Europe has with the United States not joining the Court is funding.  
Europe wants to have an effective ICC but may not be willing to pay for it alone.  As it 
will be shown, this issue is not that simple.  Money is but one of several burdens that the 
Court faces. 
D.  THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK: DRIFTING APART? 
Before getting too deep into the views of Europe and the United States on the 
ICC, it is important to have a fair understanding of the overall Euro-American political 
setting.  The origins of the modern trans-Atlantic relationship between Europe and the 
United States has deep roots into the past, but most of the vital characteristics of today 
can be traced from the conclusion of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold 
War.  Throughout the Cold War and up until modern times the trans-Atlantic link has 
constituted a crucial factor in maintaining peace and stability in Europe, and indirectly 
throughout the whole world.  Why then, does there appear to be a sharp division between 
the allies on matters such as the ICC and other contemporary issues such as the necessity 
of war in Iraq? 
Many Europeans regard the United States as an aggressive power, whose 
objective is to remain the only super-power in the world, and to export its “utilitarian” 
way of life.  Europeans believe that they should provide an alternative option for 
globalization, otherwise known as “Americanization,” for the rest of the world to prevent 
9 
it from becoming a homogenized “cultureless” consumer society.  The Americans usually 
accuse the Europeans of hypocrisy and ingratitude.  For example, they consider the EU 
politically inefficient and sarcastically recall former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
request for one telephone number.11  The current clash of views among the allies on the 
necessity of a war with Iraq seems to support the view that a significant gap has been 
formed between the United States and the core of the European states.  It not only shows 
differences in the fields of culture, economics, security and defense but also implies an 
overall trend suggesting that Europe and the United States are drifting apart.  With the 
end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it may seem that the 
goals of Europe and the United States have begun to diverge especially when looking at 
issues such as the ICC.  The fact is, however, that many of those goals never were 
perfectly parallel or converging.  In some respects, the Cold War itself can be seen as a 
major cause for Europe and the United States having some trouble with their relationship 
today. 
Due to their different Cold War experience and heritage, Americans strongly 
believe in military might while the Europeans are committed to more peaceful and 
diplomatic solutions to international problems.  This arrangement was caused by a 
historical pattern that was initiated by a dilemma that Europe faced with the escalation of 
the Cold War and with the realization that the Soviets posed a threat on the eastern 
European border.  On one hand they needed the American financial and military aid 
against Soviet expansion, on the other hand they did not want to be dependent on a power 
far away from Europe.  Close political, economic and military cooperation between the 
Western European states could be the only way out of this dilemma, but the imminent 
Soviet threat, the fear of a German revival, and severe economic problems prevented 
them from considering this option seriously.  Both Europe and the United States realized 
that without massive American involvement the freedom of Europe was in danger.  A 
cliché of the times was, “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
                                                 
11 It refers to Kissinger’s frustration with the lack of unified European position on foreign policy issues. 
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down.”  With the announcement of the Truman Doctrine12 in March 1947, the United 
States assumed this task and committed itself to help free peoples in their fight against 
Communism.  The Truman Doctrine meant a turning point in the relationship of the 
United States and Europe.  It made the United States the leading power of the trans-
Atlantic alliance and meant that Europe would become dependent on American 
protection. 
The result of this new situation was a burden-sharing misperception by both sides 
in that Americans now viewed Europeans as “free-riders” under the U.S. security 
umbrella, while Europeans viewed Americans as using Europe as a means of defending 
itself against Communism by forward deploying forces in Europe and of promoting 
American interests over European ones.  European concerns were further increased, when 
the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957.  This event signified that the Soviet Union had 
become capable of launching a massive nuclear attack on U.S. territories by its inter-
continental missiles.  It became a source of “hysteria” in the United States, and eventually 
led to the rejection of the strategy of massive retaliation.  Perhaps this can be considered 
another negative turning point in Euro-American relations.  Europe began to question the 
reliability of American commitment to defend Europe in the new security environment.  
Their logic was simple.  The United States would not risk the lives of millions of 
American citizens for the sake of Western Europe.13  And thus a cycle of mutual 
suspicion and even animosity began within the context of the Cold War. 
On top of the historical impact of post-World War and Cold War eras, there have 
also been recent policy disputes reflecting growing differences in how the United States 
and Europe view the emerging international order and resulting security environment.  
The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo rekindled the tensions between the United States and 
                                                 
12 In the background of the decision was a Soviet demand for joint control with Turkey of the Black Sea 
Straits and a British decision to withdraw financial support for the anti-Communist regime in Greece.  
Communist success in either case would give the Soviets an opening to the eastern Mediterranean and from 
there to Western Europe and the Middle East.  To contain this danger, Truman asked Congress to fund a 
massive American program of aid to Greece and Turkey which outlined the basis of the Truman Doctrine.  
Taken from:  Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security 
State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 11-12.  
13 Argyris G. Andrianopoulos, Western Europe in Kissinger’s Global Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988): 74-75. 
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Europe on the issue of burden-sharing for security and defense.14  A reevaluation of 
American forces versus European forces revealed a sharp capabilities-gap in which the 
United States by far outweighed Europe.  As Europe strives to consolidate and expand 
through institutions such as the EU and seeks some degree of autonomy (and also a 
common European market showing great potential), the United States worries that 
European initiatives could harm existing security structures and on the whole weaken 
Euro-American relations.  While defense and security issues (Kosovo, war on terrorism, 
and potential war with Iraq) are definitely at the top of the current state of Euro-American 
affairs, there still remains other outstanding issues, disputes and irritants that have also 
significantly contributed to the noted deterioration of the trans-Atlantic relationship.  One 
example, obviously, is the ICC.  Another is the Kyoto Protocol. 
In late March 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol.  In the absence of ratification, the treaty is not legally 
binding.  Bush suggested in his June 11, 2001 remarks that instead of committing to the 
Kyoto Protocol standards, the United States would combat global warming in other ways.  
In a Climate Change Review issued the same day, he listed development of energy-
efficient technology, market-based incentives to encourage industries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on their own, and conservation programs that help sequester 
carbon in the soil, as actions the United States would take. 
Initially, the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was considered its 
death knell.  The agreement can only enter into force internationally if it is ratified by at 
least 55 nations that, together, accounted for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions in 1990.  Given that the United States alone was responsible for about 25% of 
the 1990 carbon dioxide emissions, experts predicted that without the participation of the 
United States, the Kyoto Protocol would never be implemented.15  However, in July 
2001, the EU, Japan, Canada, Russia, Australia, and 170 other nations reached an 
agreement to proceed with the treaty.  In order to secure the support of highly 
                                                 
14 See Peter W. Rodman, “Drifting Apart? Trends in US-European Relations,” The Nixon Center: 
(Washington D.C. 1999): v, 1, 37-46, 56-57, 64-67, 71-72. 
15 “Abandoned by U.S., Kyoto Protocol an Ailing Patient,” U.S. Department of State (5 April 2001), 
located at: http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/005/wwwh1a05.html, [accessed 21 February 2003]. 
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industrialized nations, the EU was forced to make substantial concessions.  The targets 
for emissions reduction were reduced by two-thirds from the original goals, and countries 
were given the option of planting carbon-absorbing forests to earn pollution credits, in 
lieu of reducing emissions.16  The EU and other nations continue to pressure Bush to 
adopt the Kyoto Protocol.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has passed a 
unanimous resolution calling for him either to sign on to a revised version of the Kyoto 
Protocol, or to develop a new international agreement for reducing greenhouse gases.17  
In March 2001, a high-level delegation from the EU stated that its members intend to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol regardless of what the United States may do.  “We are very 
much prepared to go [ahead] without the U.S.… We can’t allow one country to kill a 
process to confront a major global problem like this.”18 
There have also been other cases similar to Kyoto in the post-Cold War that have 
served as irritants to Euro-American relations such as the so called “banana wars”, the 
debate over hormone-treated beef, the debate with Germany over the “Stasi” files, 
Arizona’s execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, the acquittal of an American EA-6B jet 
pilot that cut a ski-lift cable in Italy that killed twenty people, U.S. economic sanctions 
against European companies along with the steel tariffs incident, and the general 
difference between the United States and Europe on Middle East policy.19  Perhaps these 
                                                 
16 Eric Pianin, “Emissions Treaty Softens Kyoto Targets,” Washington Post (29 July 2001).  
17 Dana Milbank, “Bush Urged to Negotiate Global Warming Treaty,” Washington Post (1 August 2001).  
18 Ibid. 
19 Banana Wars – This was one of the more irritating of long-running trade conflicts between the United States and 
what is now the EU.  In the early 1990’s the EU set up a system for banana imports that would favor European colonies 
in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, whose bananas happened to be distributed by European firms and 
discriminated against Latin American bananas, which happened to be distributed mainly by U.S. firms.  GATT and the 
WTO declared the EU’s rules as a violation of standard international trading norms.  Each time it was rapped on the 
knuckles, the EU made a few cosmetic changes in its regulations and content to drag out if not defy the process.   The 
U.S. in return threatened tariffs on European goods such as Scottish cashmere sweaters, French handbags, English 
greeting cards and Italian cheese.  It seems that this episode became almost a sort of comical skirmish somewhat of a 
fun food-fight (no pun intended) but with serious consequences.  Journals such as The Economist warned that the 
situation could “easily get out of hand.” 
Hormone-treated beef – this is another trade dispute that also includes other genetically modified foods, which the EU 
has banned.  The WTO has ruled against the EU twice, and the U.S. is planning similar retaliation as in the Banana War 
case. 
Stasi files – this dispute was over the CIA’s stealthy abduction in 1990 of the files of the East German foreign 
espionage agency and the American’s refusal to share the treasure trove with the German ally.  The CIA felt the 
information was too sensitive and that the Germans were not trustworthy.  Germans took this as the highest form of 
insult. 
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incidents cannot be directly linked as causes for major changes in Euro-American 
relations but definitely they capture the emotions and sentiment.  Among this long list of 
divisive issues, the ICC stands out for its potential to have a major impact on 
international security, and can definitely be marked as a case that that has accelerated the 
“drifting apart” nature of the trans-Atlantic bond.  It is important to keep the other cases 
in mind as a frame of reference for examining the ICC and the political issues 
surrounding it.  It is also important to remember, that although the argument of this thesis 
is that the issue of the ICC is contributing to the damage of the Euro-American relations, 
the ICC is also a story of cooperation and success to some extent. 
The creation and establishment of the ICC itself shows some of the more positive 
traits found in the concern for humanity and common values held by both Americans and 
Europeans.  It appears that Europe and United States have the same well-intentioned 
goals in mind, but cannot seem to agree on how to implement and execute these goals.  
Disputes over the ICC may appear to be a gloomy situation for the trans-Atlantic 
partnership, but the diverging relations of Europe and the United States, caused by issues 
such as the ICC, may also be a good sign: “Europe today is more peaceful, undivided and 
democratic as a result of half of century of common effort that the trans-Atlantic partners 
                                                                                                                                                 
Execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand – these were two convicted murderers who claimed dual (U.S. 
and German) citizenship.  Europeans frown upon the death penalty and Arizona did not ensure the 
observation a German right to consular access for the defendants.  Urgent pleas from Bonn and 
International Court of Justice were issued and the executions were dubbed as “barbarian” by German 
officials and provoked a storm of denunciations of the United States as a rogue state that violated human 
rights and showed contempt for international law.  One of the defendants chose death by gasing which had 
a tremendous affect and resonance in Germany.  German commentators began to express doubt whether 
American and Germans shared the same system of values. 
EA-6B/Ski-lift incident – Italy was deeply shocked by a U.S. Marine court martial’s acquittal of the pilot 
who cut the ski-lift cable that left twenty dead in Cavalese in 1998.  Some Italian officials called for the re-
evaluation of military basing rights for the U.S. in Italy.  The U.S. eased some of the tension by placing 
new restrictions on training flights and pursuing the Marine pilots on other grounds. 
Economic sanctions against European companies/Steel – this was U.S. reaction to many European 
companies doing business with Iran, Libya and Cuba.  Regarding steel, this refers to tariffs that the 
President Bush placed on European steel in early 2002 and serves as another case whereby the U.S. and EU 
have both been guilty of preaching free trade where they are most competitive and then closing the markets 
or introducing other obstructions as soon it is apparent that others can match or outperform the other.   
Middle East policy -  The U.S. considers Europe’s “critical dialogue” with Iran policy as naïve and Europe 
considered U.S. policy of dual containment for Iran and Iraq as a failure.  There is also some noted 
disagreements between the U.S. and European on Arab-Israeli relations.  Europe seem to be pushing too 
hard for Palestinian statehood for American taste because Israel is claiming that it will need to limit 
Palestinian statehood on its own terms based on terrorism security issues. 
- cases taken and summarized from: Peter W. Rodman, “Drifting Apart?,” 1-4. 
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can increasingly go their own way.  That, by any definition, represents success, not 
failure.”20  This assertion may be overly optimistic, especially when coming to the 
realization that “going their own way” is not helping to ensure the success of the ICC.  
While cases such as the ICC and Kyoto show some severe differences between Europe 
and the United States, a trans-Atlantic rivalry is not necessarily in the making but rather 
that there is a lot of work to be done to overcome inherent cultural and historical 
differences.  As Christopher Patten reminded Americans and Europeans alike, as they 
have often been reminded, “there is so much more that unites us than divides us.”21  Thus 
far, the story of ICC is failure of the trans-Atlantic partners not being able to overcome 
their divisions and not capitalizing on the strength of their unities.  With this narrow but 
fair understanding of the Euro-American experience, it is possible to better comprehend 
the two events that would eventually lead to the creation of the ICC; the Nuremberg 







                                                 
20 Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?,” International Affairs (Summer 2001). 
21 Christopher Patten is the EU External Relations Commissioner.  The comments were made in his 
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II. PAST ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE  
In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual 
advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to 
the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the 
same thing does not turn out to be just for all. 
- Epicurus, Letter to Menoece and Principle Doctrines (341 – 270 B.C.) 
And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different 
laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be 
valid for all nations and all times…  
- Cicero, The Republican and the Laws (106 – 43 B.C.) 
(Natural Law and the Unity of Mankind) 
 
For the first time in modern history, criminal justice was formally exercised and 
enforced on the international plane at the conclusion of the Second World War with the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT), better known as the Nuremberg Trials and also the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) serving war crimes in the 
Pacific theatre, known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials.  Sadly, similar criminal tribunals 
were again needed to settle the atrocities that occurred in Bosnia during the 1990’s with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), also known as the 
Hague Tribunal (the Dutch city’s name includes “the” in “the Hague” and some also refer 
to the Hague Tribunal as simply “the Hague”).  A similar court was set up in Arusha, 
Kenya to preside over war crimes committed in Rwanda and has been dubbed the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  These four courts are recognized as 
the predecessors of the ICC and are now being used as examples to both support and 
critique the new Court. 
This chapter will compare and contrast the IMT and ICTY by reflecting on the 
precedents established at Nuremberg and by examining the progress upon those 
precedents at the Hague Tribunal while ascertaining both American and European views 
of these two events.  The other historical and perhaps equally important international 
tribunals – the IMTFE and ICTR – will not be examined as the focus will be on the two 
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major precedents on European soil.  Some conclusions will be drawn, along with a 
preliminary outlook on how these two historic tribunals have led to the Rome Statute 
creating the International Criminal Court (ICC) and some of the current issues and 
problems the Court is now facing. 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
There is a crude assumption that in war, societies act as if all is fair, that all 
normal moral constraints are suspended, and that they consider themselves entitled to do 
anything necessary to defeat the enemy.22 Until recent times, the rights of a sovereign 
nation to go to war, jus ad bellum, were seldom questioned and the constraints on the 
conduct of war, jus in bello, were largely ignored.  Furthermore, it was commonly 
conceived that what happened within a nation’s territorial borders was considered a 
matter of sovereignty; i.e., no one else’s business.  All these things – going to war, 
conduct in war, and internal affairs – would rarely have been considered unlawful.   
However, the “all’s fair in love and war” ideology was on some occasions 
challenged throughout history by philosophers, academics, statesmen, and others and 
most notably by the Dutch scholar and statesman, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who is 
credited as the founder of international law and whose writings were influenced by his 
abhorrence of the carnage and unjust suffering experienced through the Thirty Years 
War.23  Although some nations and armies had adopted customs and traditions to avoid 
war and protect the innocent should a war occur, it was not until the Declaration of St. 
Petersburg (1868) was signed by the major European powers that these concepts were 
taken a step further than mere customs and traditions.24  Inspired and influenced by 
thinkers like Grotius, the first comprehensive codification of international law of war was 
accomplished by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 addressing peaceful 
settlements of international disputes (1899) and the laws and customs of war (1907).25  
                                                 
22 Howard, Andreopoulos, Shulman, The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994): 1-2. 
23 Norman E. Tutorow, War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials (New York: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 1986): 3. 
24 This agreement dealt mainly with the regulation of small projectiles. 
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25 Tutorow, War Crimes, War Criminals, and War Crimes Trials, 3. 
At the same time, the Geneva Conventions from 1864 through 1949 brought forth a series 
of international agreements to regulate and prevent abuses in war and promote the 
humane treatment of prisoners of war, the sick, the wounded, and non-combatants. 
Despite these successes, all these measures were poorly enforced and applied only 
in a discriminatory and inconsistent manner.  It remained customary to extend amnesty to 
those accused of crimes of war, partly in the interest of post-war reconciliation.  As 
warfare increased in destructiveness through advancements made during 
industrialization, however, it became clear that it would be necessary to better delineate 
responsibility for the conduct of war.  Unfortunately, two world wars occurred before 
significant measures were adopted.  
 
B. THE IMT: NUREMBERG AND TRIBUNAL ADEQUACY 
The IMT has been widely thought and written about.  Most of the observations 
and arguments are widely known.  The creation of the jurisdictions of crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are recognized as the major elements of 
precedents established at Nuremberg.  These jurisdictions were established under the 
sixth of seven “Nuremberg principles,”26 as these sets of rules have come to be called, 
which are primarily concerned with breaches of international law, customs in armed 
                                                 
26 Nuremberg Principles:  
Principle 1: Any person who commits or is an accomplice in the commission of an act which constitutes a 
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable for punishment.  
Principle 2: The fact that domestic law does not punish an act which is an international crime does not free 
the perpetrator of such crime from responsibility under international law. 
Principle 3: The fact that a person who committed an international crime acted as Head of State or public 
official does not free him from responsibility under international law or mitigate punishment. 
Principle 4: The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not free 
him from responsibility under international law.  It may, however, be considered in mitigation of 
punishment, if justice so requires. 
Principle 5: Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts 
and law. 
Principle 6: The crimes hereafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: Crimes against 
Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity (detailed definitions of each are given in the document). 
Principle 7: Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity, as set forth in Principle VI, is a crime under international law. 
- Principles taken from: Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960): 96. 
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conflict, and individual responsibility under international law.27  The IMT, however, was 
designed only to serve one single conflict and left out other criminal actions such as 
piracy, drug trafficking and slavery. 
Even the strongest supporters of the IMT have acknowledged its shaky legal 
foundation.  Some critics have attacked the Nuremberg proceedings as “victor’s justice.”  
A major flaw that resulted from this weak legal framework was that Nuremberg is 
“sometimes accused of applying a body of law which had not up to that point been clear 
or fully applicable to the events under scrutiny; and this is criticized as constituting 
nothing more than victor’s justice.”28  The often-used criticism is that the defendants 
were prosecuted in an ex post facto manner on the basis of retrospective legislation.  In 
other words, the Nazis were tried for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes 
against humanity even though there were no formal international prohibitions against any 
of these crimes committed by individuals (on the individual level) during the time of their 
commission.  There were, however, existing international agreements regarding the 
conduct of nations (on the national level) pertaining to war, specifically the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928.  This treaty renounced war as an instrument of national policy 
unless in self-defense and it was under this provision that Germany and Japan explained 
and justified their actions to the IMT.29  Despite the criticisms of ex post facto law and 
retrospective punishment, Nuremberg was the first attempt to establish an international 
standard of criminal law where individuals could be held accountable.  The IMT for the 
first time held people responsible for breaches of these standards irrespective of whether 
governments had signed treaties or agreements regarding these standards. 
Nuremberg, again, introduced the world to a shift in international law where not 
only sovereign governments or nations but also individuals could be charged with war 
                                                 
27 J. Holmes Armstead, Jr., “The International Criminal Court: History, Development and Status,” Santa 
Clara Law Review (1998 Vol. 38, No. 3): 748. 
28 Adam Roberts, “Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg” in Howard, Andreopoulos, Shulman., The 
Laws of War, 134. 
29 Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University 
Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978): 110-111. 
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crimes.30  Individuals would no longer be allowed to hide behind the sovereign rule of 
their respective nation.  The Nuremberg Charter declared that, “crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.”31  It became evident that the perpetrator was not only the government of 
Germany, as it had been with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, 
but also the Nazi regime and the individual Nazi leaders. 
Since it was recognized that international law now not only applied to the state 
but could also apply to a person or to a group, the IMT decried the use of collective 
punishments and reiterated that criminal guilt had to be personal.  Furthermore, it stated 
that it should not hesitate to declare an organization to be criminal, if satisfied of its 
criminal guilt.32  In this manner, the IMT was able to declare the Nazi Party, in general, a 
criminal organization and therefore not only the Reich cabinet, military and government 
officials were tried but also other public and private officials such as bankers, 
administrators, industrialists, educators and propagandists.  The tribunal decided that a 
criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is 
cooperation for criminal purposes. 
Even if the Nuremberg Tribunal was questionable in its legitimacy because new 
laws were applied to past events and because of the “victor’s justice” syndrome, at least 
future crimes of war, including genocide, would be legitimate areas for prosecution; or so 
it seemed.  The IMT made groundbreaking progress in the realm of international law.  It 
also helped Europe to recover from its dark past and, in this light, the IMT can be looked 
at as adequately serving the situation of the time.  Nuremberg took a huge leap forward in 
changing international law for the better.  “The denunciations that plagued that tribunal – 
that it was an ex post facto proceeding, that it lacked jurisdiction, that it amounted to 
                                                 
30 Geoffrey Best suggests that the War Crimes Tribunals did not have much effect on international law (a 
view that may be challenged) but rather that the main novelty and innovation of Nuremberg was the 
concept of personal responsibility even while under superior orders in his book: War and Law (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1997): 205-206. 
31 Robert K. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials, 96. 
32Ibid., 191. 
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victor’s vengeance – need not be heard again.”33  With Nuremberg, the world attained a 
great legal precedent that created a basis for laws that supersede nations and a basis for a 
justice system that is capable of new limits. 
Although the Nuremberg Trials occurred after the allies claimed victory, it was 
not always obvious that this was the best course of action for prosecuting the remnants of 
the accused Nazis.  There was some disagreement among the allies34 as how to best 
handle punishing the defeated enemy.  Churchill first proposed that the “major criminals” 
should face summary execution but this plan was rejected mainly because Stalin felt all 
remnants of the Nazi regime should face the same fate, that is either immediate execution 
or trial, while many American policy-makers and advisors felt that death sentences would 
be unacceptable without a trial.35  Roosevelt seemed to have sympathy with the British 
proposal as he held back in making his position known.  “There must be no executions 
without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them,” were the words 
Churchill used to express Stalin’s point in a letter that the British Prime Minister 
delivered to President Roosevelt concerning the issue.36  And Charles de Gaulle also 
favored trial rather than summary execution.  Initially it seemed that Roosevelt favored 
the summary executions but later at the famous Yalta conference he indicated that he was 
not ready to announce his preference or to openly consider the matter.  The conference 
summary simply stated, “the question of major war criminals should be the subject of 
enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the 
conference.”37  Roosevelt soon afterward died and never made an official statement on 
the matter. 
After taking office, President Truman made it clear that he opposed summary 
executions and supported the establishment of a tribunal to try the Nazi leaders.  Once 
                                                 
33 Joseph E. Persico, Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial (New York: Penguin Books, 1994): 443. 
34 Mainly referring to the “big” three: The United States, represented by President Roosevelt – The United 
Kingdom, represented by Prime Minister Churchill – The Soviet Union, represented by Secretary-General 
Stalin. These three were allied against the powers of the Axis three, Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
35 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1992): 
31. 
36 Ibid.,31. 
37 Ibid., 32.  
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London realized that it would be outvoted it gave up its quest for summary executions.  
In the end, the British realized that this was the better decision because summary 
executions appeared as a simple solutions to a problem deserving a more complex 
answer.  Perhaps in previous decades a simple execution would have sufficed but not in 
the 1940’s.  In addition to the deaths of Hitler, Goebbels and the other top Nazis, the 
Europeans also wanted the world to make a public judgment stating that the members and 
supporters of the Third Reich wrongfully hurt innocent people.38  After all, millions of 
soldiers and innocent civilians had died – the death of a few Nazis would certainly not 
have made up for this. 
What seemed to be most important was allowing those who suffered under the 
Nazis to judge and punish.  Although the European nations that suffered most were the 
occupied continental countries, Britain seemed most adamant and vocal in implementing 
their version of justice upon the Nazis.  With Great Britain representing Europe as one of 
the “big” three allies, most of the other European allies went along with the British 
position on the issue.  British officials were generally respectful of the suffering of their 
allies on the continent but when it was Britons who were suffering, the British 
government was quick to anger.39  And while Britain and America sparred over trial 
plans, there was no controversy about drafting a special “Royal Warrant” for putting 
Germans who had abused British soldiers before a British military tribunal.40  The British 
seemed to want justice both ways; legal and political.  Those deemed the worst, mainly 
the leadership of the Nazis, would suffer under political justice while the rest would be 
given some due process.  But if democratic values and ideals were to be demonstrated in 
the Nuremberg Trials, as America convinced Great Britain, then all accused would have 
to be brought before a court.  This is the true success story of the Nuremberg Trials.  
Along with the groundbreaking progress in international law that was made, summary 
executions were avoided despite the popular desire for them.  Although the legalistic 
aspects of Nuremberg are questionable when compared to today’s standards, the fact is 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 33. 
39 Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000): 192. 
40 Ibid., 193. 
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that trials did happen and can be looked back on as perhaps the greatest episode in the 
practical application of international law. 
The foremost issue that the IMT brought forth with respect to the Euro-American 
relationship is how democratic powers should exercise international justice.  The 
Europeans, with their deep and authoritarian past, initially found summary executions for 
the worst criminals and immediate recompense more acceptable than the United States 
did.  In many ways, the British view was a realist’s view that was more desirable to the 
general public because men like Hitler, Goebbels, Keitel and Hess did not deserve a trial.  
America, with a short and liberating history, was able to conjure up a more liberal view 
of the situation claiming that no matter how bad and evil the accused were, they all 
should be formally brought before a court in order to properly charge and punish them.  
A large contributing factor to the different attitudes that cannot be ignored is that, 
although the United States gave much support and lost many soldiers, America did not 
nearly suffer as much as Europe did.  It was not Washington D.C. that was being bombed 
and it was not Ohio that was being occupied.  The United States would have almost 
certainly taken a different view if it had been Washington D.C. and Ohio.  It was 
understandable why the British and the rest of the European allies felt as they did because 
the suffering experienced in the Second World War was much more personal to them.  In 
the end the Europeans fell back on their shared democratic principles and opted for the 
trials and helped establish an important signal stating that organizations such as the Nazis 
would never be tolerated again. 
 
C. A BIG MISTAKE: EVENTS BETWEEN IMT AND ICTY 
The UN International Law Commission, upon request of the General Assembly 
with Resolution 260 in 1948, submitted a conclusion that recommended the 
“establishment of an international court to try persons charged with genocide or other 
crimes of similar gravity.”41   The General Assembly, however, postponed actions to 
create such a court because it was felt, officially, that an agreed definition of law needed 
                                                 
41  United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – taken from 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ‘Overview’ webpage, located at: 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/, [accessed 6 December 2002]. 
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to be adopted.  Unofficially, it was evident after the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trials 
(and Tokyo as well) that there was some reluctance to push ideas to create an 
international criminal court or further efforts to improve upon the precedents established 
by the IMT.  Perhaps there was a feeling that such atrocities as those committed in the 
Second World War would not happen again: 
For nearly half a century - - almost as long as the United Nations has been 
in existence - - the General Assembly has recognized the need to establish 
such a court to prosecute and punish persons responsible for crimes such 
as genocide.  Many thought…that the horrors of the Second World War - - 
the camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust - - could never 
happen again.  And yet they have.  In Cambodia, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in Rwanda.  Our time this decade even - - has shown us that 
man’s capacity for evil knows no limits.  Genocide…is now a word of our 
time, too, a heinous reality that calls for a historic response. 
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General 
A historic response that should have occurred within a few years after 
Nuremberg, namely the creation of an international criminal court, was not followed 
through and this was a big mistake.  Perhaps the onset of the Cold War put most 
international progress on hold until the dissolution of the Soviet Union made renewed 
progress possible.  Perhaps the world, and Europe in particular, just wanted to bury the 
past instead of re-opening old wounds by continuously revisiting the events of the Second 
World War and the Nuremberg Trials in order to make improvements.  Many similar 
speculative counts can be made to excuse the slow-down in progress and the stagnation 
of effort to establish a viable international legal framework for prosecuting the world’s 
worst criminals.  At the core of all these explanations, however, is the fact that it became 
acceptable to forget about the need to reform international criminal law.  Although the 
logic to establish some sort of international criminal framework was present during and 
after Nuremberg, this logic did not dominate the action of the international community.42 
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although other countries began to take great interest in international law by this point in history. 
25 
D. THE ICTY: THE HAGUE AND TRIBUNAL INADEQUACY 
World leaders failed to continue upon the logical improvements needed to 
restructure international law after the Nuremberg Trials.  What happened in Europe 
during the Second World War, including the Holocaust itself, seemed to be of less 
significance during the age of socialists versus capitalists, nuclear arms, and the space 
race.  People concerned themselves less and less with international justice and more with 
the Soviet and American rivalry.  This may be why a great “confusion and paralysis of 
the United States and Western Europe [arose] in dealing with the most brutal 
conflagration in Europe since the end of World War II;”43 the grotesque events in Bosnia.  
It sadly took other episodes of genocide for the world to remember the horrors that men 
are capable of and to reopen the books on reforming international criminal law.  The 
problem, however, is that as the events in the former Yugoslavia were occurring there 
was no time to negotiate and establish the once sought-after formal international court 
because genocide was in progress; action was imperative. 
The only viable option left was to establish an ad hoc tribunal of the sort used at 
Nuremberg.  “All that remained of some of the Clinton administration’s boldest proposals 
for dealing with the carnage was a war crimes tribunal.”44  Much effort was made to 
ensure that this tribunal would avoid the failures of the IMT.  Many considered the idea 
for a tribunal as hollow and in fact argued that a tribunal would aggravate the situation.  
Both British and French diplomats hinted that they would be willing to eliminate the 
tribunal if that was the price exacted by the Bosnian Serbs for signing a peace agreement 
but the United States would never associate itself with a peace agreement that did away 
with the tribunal; there had to be some kind of formal settling of accounts.45  
Surprisingly, Europe viewed the situation much differently than the United States.  
Whereas the Americans saw the occurrences in Yugoslavia as another Holocaust that had 
to be stopped, Europeans saw it as “an endless quagmire for European soldiers.”46  For 
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the most part, Europeans felt that if they started deeming particular ethnic groups 
involved in the conflict as criminal, this would escalate the conflict thus putting European 
soldiers already on the ground as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
danger.  This is why most European diplomats, namely British and French, would have 
accepted a peaceful solution even if it meant that criminal proceedings would be 
excluded.  In other words, it was feared that public indictments would derail any attempts 
at cease-fire negotiations.  The United States did not have forces on the ground and thus 
did not have to consider the endangerment of American soldiers.  As such, demanding the 
creation of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) was a 
much easier task for the United States than it was for the Europeans.  Since American 
involvement would eventually be needed to ensure the success, specifically in the 1995 
NATO air campaign into Bosnia, the Europeans did not want to appear as blocking a 
tribunal even though they did not support it.47  By May of 1996, the first accused war 
criminal, Dusan Tadic, was standing before the new UN criminal tribunal, the ICTY. 
To avoid the risk of falling into the Nuremberg trap of a politically motivated 
process, the statutes of the Hague Tribunal have made it perfectly clear that complaints 
similar to those concerning the Nuremberg tribunal’s use of ex post facto laws will not 
resurface, nor will they be tolerated.  In his commentary on the statute approved by the 
UN Security Council, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali stated that “the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are 
beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence does not arise.”  
At this point, the Nuremberg Principles were considered customary law along side the 
Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
The negative side to all this is that, while the Hague Tribunal is doing a great job 
of avoiding the “victor’s justice” syndrome of Nuremberg, it faces other challenges that 
the Nuremberg Tribunal did not face.  Since there is not a group of powerful victors to 
support and ensure the Hague Tribunal’s success, four major problems have arisen for the 
ICTY:  1) It has minimal power to punish and thus, with no power to enforce arrests of 
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suspects, those indicted who fail to turn themselves in (or if their government fails to 
arrest and turn them in) face little risk since, unlike Nuremberg, there can be no trials in 
absentia.  2) One of the acclaimed differences of the ICTY and the IMT is that the ICTY 
is supposed to try all defendants and not just major political or military leaders – and this 
is proving very difficult.  3) A lack of funds due to other UN operations has slowed down 
the process and has embarrassingly led to reliance on some voluntary contributions.  
Initially, the United States gave $3 million and some twenty-two staffers.  Many 
complained that Americans were trying to dominate the court.  Great Britain gave 
$30,500 and one staffer.  France gave nothing.  Even Sweden and Denmark were more 
generous than Great Britain.48  4) The ICTY faces an enormous task in gathering 
incriminating evidence for use at trial. In contrast, the Nuremberg Tribunal had the 
benefits of extensive documentation and Nazi records whereas records and physical 
evidence in the former Yugoslavia are scarce and in many cases have been tampered 
with.49  In summary, mandating that a thorough legal framework will govern the ICTY 
has at the same time compromised the efficiency and timeliness under which it can 
operate. 
The biggest problem for the ICTY is that it has not ensured that all guilty parties 
in the Former Yugoslavia are being brought to justice or that peace has been secured.  
The broader context of what has thus far transpired at the Hague Tribunal has put the 
whole idea of ad hoc tribunals into question.  Yugoslavia and Rwanda have not been the 
only countries to witness atrocities in recent times - the killing fields of Cambodia, the 
so-called disappearances in Argentina, chemical weapon use in Iraq against the Kurds, 
and the very controversial use of force in Palestine and Israel – why have ad hoc tribunals 
not been formed to handle these equally serious matters?  The fact that tribunals are 
selectively used has created the perception that a portion of those who commit 
international crimes, such as humanitarian violations, can escape punishment.  Although 
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the ICTY did go through painful efforts to avoid politicization and establish itself on a 
legal basis, the problems with ad hoc justice were again highlighted and, as with the 
Nuremberg Trials, the logical solution was to create a permanent international criminal 
court.  It would seem that the world should now be ready to take serious action to ensure 
the creation of an international criminal court but both legal and political obstacles have 
presented themselves. 
The ICTY is only now beginning to be assessed and written about.  The ICTY’s 
legacy will be carried forward with both supporters and critics.  Critics focus on the fact 
that some of the most notorious indictees remain unpunished (and indeed, at liberty) 
while the most infamous leader of the conflict, Slobodan Milosevic, was only indicted 
over four years after the initial rounds of indictments.  His trial only began in February 
2002 (The ICTY was officially established in 1993).50  Harsher critics claim that the 
ICTY was simply a cost-effective effort by some nations to relieve their guilt about not 
having intervened in a more meaningful way in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1995.51  
Supporters argue that the tribunal has made every effort to ensure just and fair trials 
through a well-established legal framework to avoid the “victor’s justice” effects of the 
past.52  How history will judge the ICTY’s proceedings is yet to be seen.  The current 
path of progress being made in the Hague is inadequate, despite its apparent improvement 
upon Nuremberg.  Today, people expect more from an international institution of law 
than they did in 1946.  If this path is continued upon, it will become very difficult to 
make a persuasive argument that the ICTY is making a noteworthy contribution to 
international criminal law or that it is deterring future war criminals from their exploits. 
With regards to the Euro-American relationship, the ICTY is proving, like the 
Nuremberg Trials, that in the end legalism triumphs over revenge and that dismissing the 
atrocities altogether is out of the question.  Europe wanted to initially throw out trials for 
the accused in Yugoslavia just as they initially wanted to throw out trials for the top Nazi 
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leaders.  Again, both counts of atrocities happened on European soil and thus were of a 
more personal nature for the Europeans than for Americans; especially since the world 
failed to prevent horrific acts that everyone promised would happen “never again.”  The 
United States was able to, once more, act like the generous helping hand to Europe by 
ensuring that the allies did not stray from the course of just and legal proceedings.  
Europeans may have resented this somewhat.  Overall, however, the blame could be put 
on both the United States and Europe for only making a symbolic effort to set up a 
tribunal but more importantly for not stopping the brutal slaughter in the beginning of the 
conflict when there was opportunity to do so – “no war crimes, no war crimes trials.”53  If 
Europe and the United States joined together to take three steps forward along the path of 
international justice at Nuremberg then they once more joined at the Hague to remain at 
best idle or even taking a step backward. 
 
E. THE EXTREMES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The IMT in Nuremberg and the ICTY in the Hague were established in markedly 
different historical contexts.  The war in the former Yugoslavia did not end with the 
unconditional surrender of the defeated, as in the Second World War, but rather through 
diplomacy and negotiation.  The Nuremberg Trials were the result of the victorious 
occupying powers forcefully administering justice.  “Victor’s justice” and “political show 
trials” are common terms used by some critics to describe the lack of legal foundation of 
the IMT.  This is not the case for the Hague Tribunal.  Although one could argue that a 
political agenda does exist, this political agenda is definitely overshadowed by a highly 
refined legal framework.  “Victor’s justice” and ex post facto laws have, without 
argument, been erased from the Hague – that is, the ICTY ensures that there can be no 
crime and subsequently no conviction or punishment without a pre-existing law, without 
adequate evidence, or without other essential elements of a well-established legal 
framework. 
The results of these tribunals are, however, quite surprising because the IMT, for 
the most part, is considered a success in that it adequately fulfilled the requirements of its 
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day, while the ICTY seems to be inadequate and failing to live up to the standards that 
were set for it to achieve.  Some argue that the ICTY is coming along slowly but surely.  
However, the process is indeed slow, and will likely result in soft punishments and in 
some cases no punishments at all.  It should also be noted that, although the Nuremberg 
Trials are considered a success for its day, its prosecution of ex post facto law and 
political slanted-ness would never be tolerated or accepted today.  The best summation 
when comparing the two tribunals comes from perhaps the foremost book on the issue to 
date, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, by Gary Jonathan Bass: “What made Nuremberg 
suspect made it strong; what made The Hague unimpeachable made it weak.”54 
What seems to have been established are extremes of international criminal 
justice: on one end there is a justice system dominated by politics, as in the case of the 
Nuremberg Trials, and on the other end there is a justice system dominated by respect for 
legal procedure, as in the case of the ICTY.  It is apparent that neither extreme can 
produce an adequate result to satisfy today’s standards and expectations.  Perhaps a more 
balanced solution between the political and legal aspects of international justice would 
produce a more desirable outcome.  Whatever the solution, it is clear that some type of 
reform is needed to provide proper and prompt justice.  This solution may lie between the 
extremes set by Nuremberg and the Hague and is necessary in order to ensure the success 
of future international criminal institutions whether in the form of other ad hoc tribunals, 
the ICC or international justice systems yet to come.  This is the situation that Europe and 
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III. BEYOND NUREMBERG AND THE HAGUE: THE ICC  
Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?  
For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms?  The band itself is 
made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together 
by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on.  
If by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree 
that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues 
peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the 
reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of 
covetousness, but by the addition of impunity.  Indeed, that was an apt and 
true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had 
been seized.  For when that King had asked the man what he meant by 
keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, “What 
thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty 
ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art 
styled emperor.”* 
- St. Augustine, The City of God (354 – 430), The Foundation of the State       
*Cicerco, De Republica, III 
…there may be controversy between two princes, where the one is not 
subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their 
subjects.  Therefore between them there should be means of judgment.  
And since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the 
other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third 
prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may 
come.  
- Dante, De Monarchia (1265 – 1321), The Need for Authoritative 
Settlement of Disputes Between States) 
The small country of Trinidad and Tobago, suffering from high crimes and 
murders caused by drug trade, suggested in 1989 that the UN resume its work to establish 
a permanent criminal court as a venue to prosecute drug traffickers.  This and other 
efforts led to creation of the Rome Statute, which founded the ICC and entered into force 
in July 2002.  With a majority of the world’s nations in support, there were 139 
signatories with 81 states party to the treaty by July 17, 2002.55  Despite this apparent 
success in establishing the world’s first criminal court, absent from the treaty was the one 
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country that has been looked upon as the premier moral and human rights leader in the 
post-World War II era - the United States. (In July 1998 in Rome, members of the United 
Nations voted to adopt the treaty of the Rome Statute - the final vote was 120 in favor, 7 
opposed, and 21 abstentions.)  The United States found itself in company with countries 
considered the enemies of human rights, with China, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Sudan, and 
Yemen also against the Court.56  “It was an embarrassing low point for a government that 
portrays itself as a champion of human rights.”57  This chapter will examine different 
views and opinions with respect to the ICC, the United States’ decision to not become a 
member of the court, and most importantly the effects this is having on the Euro-
American relationship.  The goal is not, necessarily, to take a side of the debate but rather 
to show some of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments.  The ICC is one of the 
stand-out issues that may be damaging the trans-Atlantic alliance, owing to the failure of 
Europe and the United States to come together and create a system, whether in the ICC or 
in another forum, to address international criminal justice. 
 
A. A CRITICAL VIEW: WHY THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES 
The American political figure most committed to blocking the ICC is Senator 
Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations.  In June 
of 2000, at a Congressional Hearing concerning the court, the adamant Senator warned 
that one day American servicemen and officials might be seized, extradited and 
prosecuted for war crimes.  The seizure of General Pinochet58 was a hot and controversial 
issue then, and Helms quoted a New York Times article which commented on the 
Pinochet capture: “…and I am quoting the Times, ‘The FBI has warned several former 
U.S. officials not to travel to some countries, including some in Europe, where there is a 
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risk of extradition to other nations interested in prosecuting them,’ end quote from the 
Times article.”59  Senator Helms had also previously sent a letter to Madeline Albright, 
then Secretary of State, stating that any treaty establishing a permanent criminal court 
would be “dead on arrival” in the Senate unless Washington retained some form of veto 
power over it. 
The Clinton administration’s general policy toward the Court was supportive.  
Secretary Albright and David J. Scheffer, who held the newly created post of 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, were the two officials in charge of ensuring 
that the American requirements were incorporated into the treaty.  When the final treaty 
was passed in July of 2000, many world diplomats cheered – many except Ambassador 
Scheffer who failed to convince the other signatories that a provision stating that 
Americans would remain immune to the Court should be included in the treaty.  All along 
President Clinton himself knew, by the warning of several on Capitol Hill, that the treaty 
would never be ratified, especially as long as the Republicans controlled both houses of 
Congress.  Partisan politics may have contributed to controversy over the Court, but there 
are two major areas where there is not a clear division of opinion between the two parties.  
The first issue is concerned with the incrimination of American servicemen, and the 
second is the everlasting debate about universal jurisdiction of international institutions. 
 
1. Endangering Service Members 
The foremost concern that opponents like Senator Helms cite is the possibility 
that the ICC could bring politically motivated charges against U.S. military personnel and 
political officials.  One example that many critics often use is the American bombing 
campaigns over Germany and Japan during the Second World War.  Could the United 
States, its leaders and its soldiers, be guilty of war crimes for bombing unintended targets 
and failing to avoid killing innocent civilians during these aerial assaults?  Indeed, many 
critics fear that this is how those wishing to prosecute Americans for political purposes 
can interpret the provisions and it would be very difficult to defend against these charges, 
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especially when examining such cases as the decision to drop atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.60 
That is why Senator Helms, supported by Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX) in 
the House, led the way in creating the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA).  
The bill not only bars any U.S. cooperation with the court, but also bars U.S. military aid 
to other countries unless they agree to shield U.S. troops on their territory from ICC 
prosecution.  It also bans U.S. troops from taking part in UN peacekeeping operations 
unless the UN Security Council explicitly exempts them from possible prosecution.61  
One version of the bill, which is still being discussed in Congress, would open the way 
for the president to use force to free U.S. prisoners hauled before the ICC, which is to be 
located at The Hague, in the Netherlands.  The Bush administration endorsed the ASPA 
on the condition that the President is given the authority to waive any of its provisions if 
he determines it is in the national interest to do so.  As laughable as it may seem to 
imagine the United States having to invade the Netherlands to bust out Americans 
brought before the ICC, if the day ever comes when an American is indicted by the Court 
it may not be a joking matter. 
Clearly, the United States has global security obligations that no other country is 
willing to undertake.  People, throughout the world, look to America for stabilizing 
hostile regions in order to ensure the common values of humanity and the security of 
global markets.  Some U.S. diplomats feel America cannot meet those responsibilities 
when the people they assign to carry out those duties are subject to prosecution by 
anyone who does not particularly care for America.62  Recent times have shown that 
there is a great amount of American resentment in certain areas of the world.  “The fairly 
extensive role the U.S. military has taken around the globe makes it leery of being tried 
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by a tribunal it can’t control.”63  Clearly, the Bush Administration’s National Security 
Strategy has made this attitude the official U.S. policy: 
We will take all actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our 
global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by 
the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans 
and which we do not accept.  We will work together with other nations to 
avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through 
such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect 
U.S. nationals from the ICC.  We will implement fully the American 
Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure 
and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials.64 
It is doubtful that the ICC will have a beneficial impact on international security, 
at least in terms attempting to end conflict with political dialogue.  Among the oldest 
tricks in the diplomat’s toolbox is the proposition that if you want to make a negotiated 
peace you may need to waive punishments for previous offenses.  This is especially true 
of conflicts settled by compromise and can be significant in bringing a lopsided victory to 
a close and, in essence, shorten the duration of conflicts.  As discussed in chapter two, 
this is why British and French officials did not want to implement the ICTY at the 
beginning of the Bosnian conflict - they feared it would only escalate hostilities.  It is 
highly important, however, in the cases where a decisive victory is not in achievable at 
acceptable cost, that the threat members of the losing side face under the ICC not 
undermine efforts for a peace settlement.65  Fighting men could be called upon to 
compromise, to lay down their arms, and give up power as long as they are assured that 
there will be no severe retribution for their actions.  This concept has long been a time-
honored device but the ICC stands to eliminate this option for peace.  The bottom line is 
that, from an American perspective, having an ICC may be a higher risk to fighting 
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soldiers and may serve to draw out conflicts that may have otherwise been settled 
diplomatically. 
 
2. The Unacceptability of Universal Jurisdiction 
The idea behind universal jurisdiction is recognizing that some crimes are so 
heinous that their perpetrators should not escape justice by hiding under the protection of 
their government, or by fleeing to countries that either are not concerned, unaware, or 
unable to respond; where punishments are soft or non-existent.66  This is a noble concept 
and was the driving force in Nuremberg and still is the main reason why the ICTY 
continues its process.  In the past, ad hoc tribunals (such as the Nuremberg Trials and the 
ICTY), national courts, or military summary courts have been used to fulfill the goals of 
universal jurisdiction.  They are not referred to in terms of universal jurisdiction, 
however, because these bodies were designed to be temporary, only applied to designated 
individuals, groups or countries (thus not universal) and in general have worked well to 
serve the circumstances they were created to serve.  The ICC is designed to take over as a 
permanent institution to service the all-encompassing definition of universal jurisdiction. 
One critical issue is the relationship between universal jurisdiction and national 
reconciliation as experienced, for instance, by Europe after the Second World War.67  It 
is an important principle that those who commit war crimes or continually violate human 
rights should be held accountable.  There may, however, be an even more important 
benefit of helping a country or a people to recover from these crimes simply by designing 
a tribunal specially tailored to rule on a specific account such as Nuremberg and the 
ICTY.  Simply having a court within the borders where atrocities occurred can have some 
healing power because the afflicted people can then feel a sense of connection with the 
process of justice.  The ICC is broad and vague in its jurisdiction and is not tailored to 
specific events.  Both the ICC and the ICTY are located in the Hague.  The ICTY, 
however, may have had a more personal meaning to the afflicted masses in the former 
Yugoslavia if the court would have been located in Bosnia or Kosovo or even both.  Keep 
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in mind that the ICC is allowed and, in fact, required to cede jurisdiction to national 
courts if they are willing and able to function. 
The claim of universal jurisdiction is furthermore in violation of established 
international rules concerning treaties and undermines state sovereignty, setting a 
dangerous precedent.  Unlike other international treaties, the Rome Statute specifies that 
once the ICC comes into existence, it may exercise jurisdiction over personnel of states 
that are not party to the treaty.  However, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties states that “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
state without its consent.”68  Thus, another major point critics make is that the ICC 
undermines the sovereignty of nations and violates the Vienna Convention.  On the other 
hand, supporters argue that it is necessary to ensure all violators can be brought to justice. 
 
3. Overall Success Doubtful 
The ICC will not likely achieve its goal of deterring heinous crimes because it 
does not (and should not) have sufficient authority in the real world.  There is no 
evidence that affirms the Court’s deterrent capability, primarily because the ICC is only 
now coming into existence and thus every analysis of the Court at this point is purely 
speculative.69  Moreover, it takes a certain amount of political will for a single country or 
a group of united countries to stand up to men, organizations, and governments that 
commit heinous acts.  Advocates of universal jurisdiction, implemented through 
mechanisms such as the ICC, would argue that because the state is the basic cause of war 
then it could not be trusted to deliver justice.  These supporters would uphold that if law 
replaced politics, then peace and justice would prevail.  But even a shallow examination 
of history, even limiting the scope to Europe during the Second World War and 
Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, shows that there is no evidence to support such a statement.  
Even if law could replace politics, then there would be the risk of a tyranny of judges 
replacing the tyranny of statesmen.  “The role of the statesman is to choose the best 
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option when seeking to advance peace and justice, realizing that there is frequently a 
tension between the two and that any reconciliation is likely to be partial.”70 
A popular assumption for Americans is that the Europeans are much more open to 
international institutions, such as the ICC, because their efforts to consolidate over the 
years have resulted in many common institutions.  Different countries, mainly through 
the coordination of the EU, have adopted these institutions.  The idea is that the member 
countries surrender part of their sovereignty to supranational European institutions.  
There is even a European Court of Justice that ensures that the conflicts between 
member-states are resolved but more importantly ensures that overall community law 
does not come into conflict with any one country’s law; and if it does then usually the 
community law wins out.  This European court, however, is more similar to the UN 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) than it is to the ICC, at least in the sense that it is not 
a criminal tribunal, but rather one that rules of questions of due process, legal 
jurisdiction, and so on.  To date there is no purely criminal court for the whole of Europe 
that tries individuals on criminal grounds.  This fact has led many like Professor of 
Government, Jeremy Rabkin from Cornell University to inform policy makers that it 
should be of no surprise that the United States and others are reluctant to consider such a 
court: “If you look at the European Union, they have now a common flag, they have 
common passports, they have a common parliament, they have all these common 
institutions.  One institution which they do not have is a common criminal court, because 
the countries of Europe, which are willing to share a lot of power, are not willing to share 
that.”71  Then why are all the countries of Europe willing to create a criminal court with 
global jurisdiction if they are not even willing to create such a court for their own region?  
Perhaps they feel that the ICC itself is filling both a regional and global role and that it 
would only duplicate effort.  The answer is not exactly clear but surely the Europeans 
should not be opposed to the idea of a European Criminal Court.  If the people of Europe 
want to surrender their individual countries’ sovereignty and fall under the rule and 
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judgment of one European body then that is their business, but the United States should 
not be expected to surrender its sovereignty to fall under the rule and judgment a similar 
sort of global body – that body in form of the ICC or any form for that matter. 
 
B. THE SUPPORTING VIEW: WHY EUROPE IS IN FAVOR 
In the last 100 years or so, millions of people have been killed by crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.72  After Nuremberg, there was a hope 
that there would be a “permanent Nuremberg,” - that people like Hitler everywhere 
around the world would be prosecuted in an international criminal court.  The Cold War 
may have been a big reason this was prevented.  It may be that the failure to prosecute 
men such as Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and Saddam Hussein has only encouraged acts like 
Karadzic and Milosevic.  There is no incontrovertible proof that an international criminal 
court is an effective deterrent to such men, but not having an international criminal court 
is definitely an encouragement.73  The ICTY does have roughly half of the listed 
indictees in its custody and this includes all the major leaders considered to be the 
masterminds of the genocide.  At a minimum, there is no reason to assume that a working 
system of international criminal justice would be any less effective as a deterrent than are 
comparable systems within nations. 
An additional argument for the ICC is that the UN Security Council may not be 
able to create ad hoc tribunals for every circumstance requiring them.  The term “tribunal 
fatigue”74 refers to the expensive and politically exhausting process that the Security 
Council undergoes when creating new courts, requiring new judges, new courtrooms, 
staffing, and so on.  This is why the world turned to the idea of a permanent court; so that 
this tedious process does not have to be endlessly repeated.  Avoiding “tribunal fatigue” 
makes the ICC a worthy cause.  When looking at the two biggest gripes that critics have 
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with the Court - endangering service members and universal jurisdiction - the proponents 
have put their own positive angle on these issues. 
 
1. Service Members Should NOT Fret the Court 
It seems that the United States has overemphasized the risk that an American may 
have to face the ICC, while it has underemphasized the ICC’s potential to save lives.75  It 
has not been clearly established that the ICC will be able to deter international criminals, 
but even if an effective ICC only occasionally makes a tyrant think twice before 
committing atrocities then this could translate into lives saved.  This has not, however, 
been considered as important to American diplomats as the vulnerability the ICC may 
impose on American servicemen.  But American soldiers are already vulnerable to 
foreign courts whether the ICC exists or not.  The same applies to American tourists and 
visitors living abroad.  There are exceptions when the United States obtains a letter of 
agreement with the hosting country such as the military often does with Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFA).  Under such arrangements the host country agrees to turn over 
suspected American criminals to United States officials.  While the Rome delegates did 
not entirely rule out the possibility of an American being prosecuted, they provided 
substantial protection against unjustified prosecutions.  Since it is not U.S. policy to 
commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, American soldiers and 
officials are very unlikely to come under the ICC’s jurisdiction and this should alleviate 
any of their fears.76  And if an American commits such crimes outside of the United 
States then the United States may not be only country with rights to prosecute that 
individual.  That is where the ICC could intervene and ensure that the guilty party does 
not go unpunished or that any aggrieved country does not over-punish the guilty.  
However, and as it will later be discussed, the ICC would first allow the United States to 
try American indictees and as long as the result of the trial was deemed legitimate then 
the ICC would not become involved at all. 
                                                 




To add more comfort to those that fear the Court, the ICC Treaty protects all 
bilateral agreements exempting U.S. troops stationed abroad from local criminal justice.77  
Terms can now be added to the existing SOFAs and included in new agreements to 
protect U.S. troops from international turnovers as well.  Let it not be forgotten that most 
international dialogue is open and official, but some diplomacy is less formal and often 
occurs quietly and without much public disclosure.  The United States retains 
considerable soft power, which leaves many ways of dissuading governments from 
attempting to try an American.78  These include everything from diplomatic and 
economic pressure to the threat of military force.  This kind of persuasion may not be a 
perfect fix (a perfect fix would be altering the treaty itself) but it could be a meaningful 
way in which the United States could at least support the Court and continue its important 
security role even if it does not sign the treaty. 
 
2. The Good of Universal Jurisdiction 
The ICC, in one sense, may adequately address concerns about universal 
jurisdiction through the principle of complementarity.  That is, the ICC will first defer to 
the national systems of justice to investigate and prosecute allegations against citizens of 
any given country.  Only when the Court determines that the national system is either 
unable or unwilling to fulfill these responsibilities, or that it has not done so in good faith, 
will it assert its jurisdiction.  The national courts are to be given priority and the chance to 
handle cases first before the ICC can do so.  Again, the ICC will step in if local courts 
have collapsed or the country shows a “genuine unwillingness” to conduct a thorough 
trial.79  The American justice system is widely recognized as a model of legitimate due 
process and it would be unimaginable that the ICC would not accept the ruling of 
American courts. 
Some confusion has arisen over the meaning of the term “statute” and its 
implications.  In domestic terms, a statute is a law passed by a legislature and once passed 
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that law applies to all citizens that are represented by the legislature.  If a particular 
citizen does not agree with the statute, if the citizen voted against the statute or did not 
vote for the officials represented in the legislature, it would not matter and that citizen 
would still be subject to the law created through that statute.  It is much simpler in 
international diplomacy.  An international statute is simply a treaty between countries 
establishing law for the countries who are party (sign and ratify) to the treaty.  This 
international definition of “statute” generally applies to all treaties, including the Treaty 
of Rome (also referred to as the Rome Statute or ICC treaty), which founded the ICC. 
As noted earlier, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty states, 
“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.”  
The United States, now with its signature removed from the treaty, claims that it is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.  However, the United States does support and abide 
by other international agreements that it has not ratified, and it also expects other 
countries to support and abide by them regardless of whether they have signed.  
Nuremberg held German officials liable to the Geneva laws even though Germany was 
not a signatory of those conventions at the time.  For a current example, the United States 
has not ratified the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, yet it routinely sends the U.S. 
Navy to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPS) on countries that claim 
seas beyond the scope of the treaty, whether those countries have signed and ratified the 
treaty or not.  So how is the ICC treaty any different?  Obviously, it is different only 
because the most powerful country opposes it.  The fact is universal jurisdiction has 
helped the United States enforce international law in the past and presently issues such as 
freedom of seas, even if it does seem to contradict the Vienna Convention.  Apparently, 
applying this concept to the ICC treaty is all of a sudden inconvenient. 
 
3. Hopeful Prospects 
The EU and other supporters of the ICC have pledged to continue their work with 
or without the United States.  The EU sees this as an opportunity to fill the leadership role 
of an important international institution that everyone expected to be led by the United 
States.  Imagine if the United States got what it wanted – an ICC under the UN Security 
Council with veto power over prosecutions.  Here is the scenario: 
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Russia could have vetoed prosecution of the Serbs for crimes in Bosnia, or 
of Saddam Hussein for using poison gas against the Kurds.  France could 
have blocked prosecution of Rwandan officials for the 1994 genocide.  
China could have turn thumbs down on a trial of Pol Pot and his Khmer 
Rouge colleagues for the Cambodian holocaust.  Britain could have 
stopped the prosecution of Nigerian officials for the Biafra slaughter.  And 
the United States could have ensured that the leaders of the death squads 
of the 1980s in El Salvador were never brought to trial.  Only defendants 
from countries lacking a protector among the permanent five would ever 
find themselves in the dock.  In addition, of course, the five permanent 
members would guarantee their own immunity, so that, for example, the 
crimes of Russia in Chechnya or of China in Tibet would have been 
untouchable.80 
Better to have no court at all then one so grossly flawed.  For this reason, there is no way 
to establish and effective ICC while giving the United States a guarantee that Americans 
would never be brought before the Court.  “If the U.S. says ‘we are from a different 
nature, we cannot be compared with others, discipline is good for others, but not for the 
United States,’ then the future of humanity is at stake.  If the United States believes it 
doesn’t need to respect multilateralism and international rules, how do you get China to 
respect them,”81 were comments made by an unnamed senior European diplomat.  That is 
why Europe and the rest of the world are better off continuing along the path of progress 
without the United States.  Apparently, this is their sincere intention echoed in a 
statement made by Christopher Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations: 
“We are sorry that the U.S. walked away from this international undertaking.  The ICC is 
the most important advance for international law since the establishment of the United 
Nations.  We will not allow [anybody] to water down the commitments contained in the 
ICC treaty.”82 
Overall, Europe has a chance to mold the ICC without American interference.  
The fact is, the United States does not have to sign the treaty to influence the Court.  It 
could support the ICC without signing the Treaty of Rome and still use its soft power to 
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bend members of the ICC to reform the Court in a manner that supports American 
interests.  Another option is: “The United States can watch the Court take shape before 
deciding to join.  If the Court handles its work in a just and fair manner, free from 
political bias, only then need Washington consider signing up.”83  By all-out opposition, 
the United States is missing the chance to at least shape the Court to its liking.  Europe is 
very positive about making the ICC succeed and if it does, then Europe will be leading an 
institution that has the support of nearly every nation in the world.  This is exactly what 
the EU could use to establish itself as a viable organization serving not only Europe but 
also the international community. 
 
C. AMERICA IN CONFLICT WITH ITSELF 
In a way, the United States’ negative vote for the ICC Treaty and its current 
stance regarding the Court are strange because they are in conflict with American ideals 
and its prior conduct.  The United States, more than any other nation, brought about the 
signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco in 1945.  After the Second World War, the 
principal architect for the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo Tribunals was also the United 
States.  More recently, it was the United States that insisted on the tribunals that are now 
adjudicating the war crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda.  The United States, has in fact, 
pushed for international institutions and organizations as an effective and low-cost way to 
serve its national interest for issues such as controlling weapons proliferation, terrorism, 
and regulating the global markets.  Some of the international treaties that have been 
created over time have been signed by the United States and some have not.  For the most 
part, however, the United States supports international treaties and their provisions even 
if it is not a signatory.  A country can support and abide by a treaty without actually 
signing it, such as in the previously mentioned case of the UN Convention on Law of the 
Sea.  That the United States has signed or “unsigned” the ICC is not as significant as the 
fact that the United States is in all-out opposition to the Court but there is some 
symbolism with a signature, especially in the case of the ICC.  President Clinton decided 
that the only way to stay engaged in the process of advancing U.S. goals of creating an 
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impartial, effective and properly constituted ICC was to sign the treaty.  By not seeking 
or recommending ratification until the “technical glitches” and “serious flaws” in the 
treaty were addressed, he sustained his commitment to protecting Americans from 
unwarranted prosecutions.  By “unsigning” the treaty, President Bush made it absolutely 
clear that he had closed the door on the possibility that the United States would ever 
support the ICC.  The actions of the two Presidents show an America conflicted by its 
sense of moral standing and its natural inclination to protect itself. 
 
D. DISAGREEMENTS THREATEN NOT ONLY THE ICC BUT ALSO THE 
TRANS-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP 
The United States has managed to win agreements from twenty-four countries to 
never surrender to the ICC any Americans who happen to be within their borders, 
offering the same in return, and is pushing many other countries to sign similar deals.  
American hopes that a web of such agreements, which it claims are sanctioned under an 
obscure provision of the Court’s treaty in Article 98, will in effect give it the global 
immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction to which it insists it is entitled.84  The EU tried to 
impose a ban on any such deals between America and its member-states, as well as 
central European countries attempting to join the organization.  The United States in turn 
made reciprocal suggestions to countries wanting to join NATO and, ironically, some of 
these countries are trying to join both NATO and the EU.  With the United States 
threatening to either veto UN peacekeeping operations or at least withdraw American 
forces, the Europeans have toned down their opposition.  In July 2002 the residing 
president of the EU announced before UN Security Council that, “The EU welcomes the 
compromise reached in the UN… [and] particularly pleased that the mandate of the UN 
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Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) is extended until the end of the year.”85  The 
extension of the mandate will ensure an orderly transition between the UN Mission and 
EU Police Mission.  Some Europeans have looked on this agreement as a necessary point 
of balance to support a continued international presence in the region that is crucial to 
peace and stability.  Others believe that the agreement is an attack on the credibility of 
the UN and on the progress that the ICC has thus far achieved. 
The United States may, as well, be setting a bad example for other countries that 
also seek immunity and want to undermine the Court.  It is likely that brutal dictators that 
want to shield themselves and their actions against foreign intervention rule those 
countries and this may not be in the American interest.  Particularly in the case of the 
peacekeepers in Bosnia, the American threats to withdraw its forces from the region is 
bad for stability and damages U.S. credibility in the region.86 
For the Europeans, the American stance amounts to a double standard: one set of 
rules for the United States, another for the rest of the world.  Several stands taken by the 
United States since the end of the Cold War – against the Kyoto Protocols on greenhouse 
gases, against biological weapons testing, against a ban on land mines – have especially 
irritated the Europeans.87  Other Europeans feel that the ICC issue is not as huge an issue 
as it appears.  When asked about this, a Foreign Office official said that although there 
were clearly “some people out there who wanted the ICC question to be as big a spat with 
America as possible, there really has not been a great surge of anger in the U.K. about 
it.”88  But the United Kingdom, America’s closest ally, may not represent the central 
European view.  And the British themselves have said that the United States is wrong in 
its assumptions about the Court.  The United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook 
has said, “While we understand the concerns of [the US] Congress we think it’s a mistake 
to think American servicemen would come before the ICC so long as that a U.S. remedy 
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is available for such a crime.”89  The ICC issue is a big deal because if the Court fails, the 
Europeans may blame the United States and many have said that the Court will mainly 
fail because it needs the United States for funding and to give the Court backing power.  
If the Court succeeds, the Europeans will remain upset that the United States refuses to 
acknowledge the ICC as a legitimate international institution.  Either way, the United 
States looses and America and Europe are put on opposing sides. “Unless we get our 
way, even in minor episodes, we’ll shut down the system of international cooperation.  
That dictatorial language is both insufferable and unnecessary, and our allies have every 
right to protest it.”90  Because America is powerful and has many ways of imposing its 
will, it may be that the United States does not need the ICC (at least  in  terms  of 
prosecuting American criminals) but the rest of the world does and the United States 
should be sensitive to that.  It is not big deal that the United States looses out on 
becoming part of the ICC but it is a huge deal that the United States may be loosing its 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: WHERE NOW 
WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE EURO-
AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP  
Civil and natural law are not different kinds, but different parts of law, 
whereof one part, being written, is called civil, the other, unwritten, 
natural.  But the right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by 
the civil law be abridged and restrained: nay, the end of making laws is no 
other but such restraint, without which there cannot possibly be and peace.  
And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit that 
natural liberty of particular men in such manner, as they might not hurt, 
but assist one another and join together against a common enemy. 
- Hobbes, Leviathan (1588-1679), Civil Law and Natural Law 
For the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this 
world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of nature had a 
power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain 
offenders.  And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for 
any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in the state of perfect 
equality where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over 
another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs 
have a right to do so. 
- Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1632-1704), The State of Nature 
The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature 
compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can 
administer justice universally. 
- Kant, Idea for a Universal History and Perpetual Peace (1724-1804),        




Many of the pros and cons concerning the ICC have been reviewed and it has 
been suggested that it is an unfortunate circumstance that Europe and the United States 
now oppose each other on this issue.  In many ways, Europeans and Americans want the 
same thing – they want an effective international method to properly judge and punish the 
world’s worst criminals.  But the trans-Atlantic partners cannot agree on how to attain 
this goal.  The two sides are talking past one another and are unable to compromise.  As 
long as the United States has anything to do with it, the ICC will not be an effective 
institution and it is probably too late for America to change its mind on the issue.  So 
what is left as an option for a middle ground solution?  This chapter will attempt to make 
some conclusions and recommendations to that end. 
 
A. SOME IDEAS ON A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE 
First, ad hoc tribunals could remain as the status quo, similar to those established 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).  Second, mixed courts, also what 
are being called “hybrid” or “special” courts, which share some similarities with ad hoc 
tribunals could be created as has been done in Sierra Leone.  Third, the international 
community could leave international criminal justice to national courts, assisting those 
governments that are too weak, too poor or in danger of collapsing and thus unable to 
conduct effective trials on their own.  This third option has been exercised in places such 
as the Congo and East Timor.91  The first and third options are reasonably clear in what 
they entail but the second option, specials courts, needs a little explaining.  Special courts 
are created and run by the United Nations but unlike the ad hoc tribunals, which only 
have jurisdiction over international offenses, these types of courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over international offenses and national offenses of the home country 
sponsoring the court.  To speed up the set-up process, the Sierra Leone Special Court has 
adopted rules of ICTR and other existing international criminal institutions.  The 
advantage is that the special courts do not have to “re-invent the wheel” and the country 
where offenses were committed has a big influence in how the court is operated while 
still receiving assistance from the UN.92 
The Europeans, along with many other supporters, have pledged to continue 
implementing the ICC but at the same time have not suggested that ICC take over 
existing ad hoc tribunals, special courts, or other arrangements currently in progress.  The 
long-term goal of the ICC is to replace these other forms of international criminal 
institutions but it is unlikely that this goal will be achieved any time soon.  To do so 
would require the ICC to fulfill the roles of ad hoc tribunals, special courts, and other 
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forms all in one institution, which would require a great deal of reform to the present 
structure of the ICC.  Some possibilities (listed below) could make the ICC a more 
desirable choice of compromise between the Europe and the United States. 
First, the ICC may consider only headquartering itself in the Hague but setting up 
court for specific cases in the aggrieved country or region, when possible, in order to give 
people a sense that justice is being served where it should; in their own backyard where 
atrocities occurred and not in some distant place where there is no sense of ownership of 
the process.  At the headquarters, there could be a pool of judges that could be drawn 
from for this purpose, along with all necessary staff and apparatus.  If there were enough 
judges, they could specialize in certain areas of international law such as military 
operations, business, diplomacy, and universal human rights.  “The United States should 
take steps to make sure that the members of the International Criminal Court are educated 
in the nature and demands of modern military operations.”93  The benefit is that there 
would be a permanent international criminal justice structure that could be molded for 
specific events.  When judges and their staffs are not handling a case, then they are 
closely monitoring world events, studying the law, maintaining dialogue with the 
members of the court, and perhaps conducting mock trials to keep their skills honed.  On 
the other hand, there may be enough cases brought before the court to keep the whole 
organization well occupied. 
Second, the ICC would partner itself with the countries concerned, similar to the 
special courts, and set up a court that is run by both representatives of the UN and 
representatives of the countries concerned.  Like special courts, concurrent jurisdiction of 
international and national law would be created.  If desired, the countries concerned 
could include judges and staff of their own (obviously some stringent guidelines would 
be needed) as another way to give those countries ownership of the process.  The problem 
ad hoc tribunals are currently facing, and a problem that the ICC will similarly face, is the 
non-cooperation of the countries where atrocities occurred.  For example, as with the two 
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ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), the lack of state cooperation, including inadequate 
access to evidence and crimes sites, and the unwillingness of many states to arrest 
indicted individuals, are hindering progress.94 
Finally, the ICC will have to be powerful enough to enforce its jurisdiction and 
back up its decisions.  If an institution such as the ICC is to ever truly have a deterrent 
capability, then those who commit atrocities will have to clearly see that those institutions 
are capable of imposing their will through force if necessary.  What this likely means is 
that the ICC cannot remain a separate entity from the UN but will have to at least form a 
strong partnership.  Of course, this brings back the argument that the Security Council 
veto power will compromise the Court by introducing political considerations.  On the 
other hand, is there such a thing as an apolitical international organization?  Is it not more 
desirable that the politics of such a court reside at a premier and all-encompassing 
institution such as the UN rather than at a new, untested, and independent ICC?  Justice 
will always have to be enforced and assured through force in one form or another, 
otherwise judgments would be nothing more than abstract pronouncements. 
The ICC and international justice in general are issues of great concern and it will 
likely continue to remain one of the top issues of international affairs far into this new 
millennium.  Together, Europe and the United States could create a powerful system that 
has long been sought for addressing international crimes.  Apart, the two partners will 
work against each other and detract from progress that has thus far been made.  That is 
why great care must be taken when proceeding and compromising on the solution for 
international criminal justice. 
 
B. WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING NOW: THE IRAQ TEST-BED 
The United States has promised to bring the Saddam Hussein regime to justice, 
but how will it go about doing this?  Obviously the ICC is out of the question.  Since the 
United States has chosen to act unilaterally in Iraq and ignoring objections from other 
Security Council members (especially France and Russia), having the UN sponsor an ad 
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hoc tribunal seems a doubtful American proposed idea.  The ICC would have no 
jurisdiction over most of Saddam’s crimes in any case, since they occurred before the 
Treaty of Rome entered into force.  As mentioned in Chapter I, the ICC statutes state that 
only crimes committed after July 1, 2000 are eligible for trial.  So if the court tried 
Hussein, then the ICC would be guilty, as Nuremberg was, of applying a body of law 
which had not up to that point been clear or fully applicable.  As such, a case brought 
before the ICC could not address Saddam’s long track record of crimes against Iraqi’s, 
which makes it a very poor venue for this purpose.  On the other hand, ad hoc tribunals 
are a possibility, however, because China, one of the five permanent Security Council 
members, also voted against the Rome Statute.  Thus, if the UN decided to defer the case 
to the ICC, China and the United States would most likely object and could suggest a 
tribunal as the next best alternative.  This does not seem to be the case, however, as it 
appears that the United States will again act unilaterally in administering justice in Iraq.  
On February 28, 2003, with no fanfare and no media attention, the Department of 
Defense posted a 6000-word document on its website entitled: Military Commission 
Instruction, which apparently includes military tribunals in the post-war plans.95  With 
military tribunals, there is no full guarantee of due process, secret hearings are permitted, 
death sentences can be imposed much more easily than in civil cases, and there are no 
appeals to civil courts. 
While the United States’ likely choice of military tribunals has enraged many 
supporters of the ICC, the ICC itself has been used by flamboyant journalist, and the like, 
to threaten its supporters and is showing some potential to backfire on countries that have 
signed the treaty.  The London Times published an article on March 18, 2003 that stated, 
“Should the United Kingdom attack Iraq without consent of the United Nations Security 
Council, and civilians are compromised in any way, Tony Blair will be liable for 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which are a violation of 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.”96  This does seem ridiculous when the 
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quoted article makes a case against Tony Blair being tried at the ICC and says nothing 
about Saddam Hussein or any other tyrant who has been known to bring suffering to 
people.  Tony Blair is not even close to being in the same league that Saddam Hussein is 
in with respects to being suspect of international crimes.  Without knowing it, the 
journalist who wrote the quoted article is potentially doing serious damage to the ICC, 
especially when used to accuse one of its greatest supporters, Tony Blair, who represents 
the United Kingdom.  This is a preposterous use of the ICC to support anti-war 
propaganda and even more practically, the purpose of the ICC is not aimed in preventing 
state action (that is the job of the UN and other international bodies and agreements) but 
rather is designed to discourage individuals from committing international crimes and 
properly punishing them if they do so.  If the supporters are going down the route of 
using the ICC as tool to promote their own agendas, then the United States’ concerns 
about the court – politically motivated charges, unaccountability, and unlawful 
jurisdiction - have been validated and it should be disbanded immediately.  Another 
London Times article summarizing the personal views of Senator Jesse Helms also 
quoted a Dutch diplomat who said about the Court, “I won’t say we gave birth to a 
monster, but the baby has some defects.”97  In the same article Helms says that the court 
is a monster and that it needed slaying.  The United States is falling unfavorably with the 
rest of world for not supporting the Court but now that some journalists, scholars and 
activists have found ways to taunt political figures (such as President Bush or Prime 
Minister Blair) with the ICC, there may be an overall better understanding of the 
American stance toward the court. 
 
C. A FINAL OUTLOOK 
At the heart of the United States’ disapproval of the ICC is the question of 
sovereignty.  All other arguments about exposing soldiers and officials to unlawful 
jurisdiction lead to the issue of sovereignty.  Logically, why should the most powerful 
nation on the earth surrender its power and sovereignty if it does not have to?  The United 
States has demanded that the UN Security Council be in charge of tribunals concerning 
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grave breaches of international law, not an independent court.  According to John Bolton, 
the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,  “the ICC will 
be overbearing and unaccountable… Why should anyone imagine that bewigged judges 
in the Hague will succeed where cold steel has failed?”98  The real issue is that the United 
States does not want to subject itself to the court because it fears the great power it holds 
will be reduced in some way and that its sovereign rights as a state to act independently 
may be somewhat limited.  This assessment may be correct: 
For, if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage 
over and against the claims of his state, and his duties proclaimed 
irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state, then the 
position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and entitled to 
command their obedience, has been subject to challenge, and the structure 
of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy. 99 
This assessment should be nothing the United States should fear, however.  
Rather it should be something for the United States to embrace because this has been the 
central basis on which the world has prosecuted its worst criminals in the past.  There is 
no reason why the next step should not be taken to prevent state sovereignty from 
obstructing world justice:  “Nuremberg deprived individuals of the right to excuse terror 
by hiding behind sovereign immunity.  The time may come when states can be held to the 
same standard.”100 
Regardless of what the United States does in the future with respect to the ICC, 
the current American position has contributed to the deterioration of trans-Atlantic 
relations and may harm U.S. efforts to prosecute future war criminals and potentially in 
the continuing war on terrorism.  American success will depend on aid from its friends 
and allies and so far America is off to a shaky start.  On the other hand, it is a good 
possibility, with genuine concern and diplomatic skill, that the United States and Europe 
will be able to reach a commonly valued outcome for international criminal justice, 
whether that be in the form of the ICC or not. 
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The implications for situations much further in the future may be more profoundly 
affected by how the United States and Europe proceed from this point forward in the 
quest to rid the world of future Hitlers, Pol Pots, Pinochets, Milosevics, and Husseins and 
bring such men to justice.  The spirit of the ICC and the logic that it has been founded on 
are strong but it is not clear that it will be effective or even survive without the full 
backing of the world’s most powerful country - the United States.  It is unfortunate that 
cooperation has thus far failed to establish a common solution for ensuring that acts such 
as the Holocaust and episodes of genocide are not repeated and that the lessons learned 
from Nuremberg to the Hague are not taken in vain.  Unfortunately, it will likely take 
more atrocities before world justice is properly served. 
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